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ARTICLES

THE ROLE OF FOREIGN PRECEDENTS IN A COUNTRY'S
LEGAL SYSTEM'
Chief Justice K.G. Balakrishnan*

The use offoreign judgments in domestic constitutionaladjudicationhas proved
to becontentious in both the USA and India. ChiefJusticeBalakrishnanargues
that there is no principleof law that constrains a constitutionalcourtfrom
referringto thesejudgments, and specifically addresses possibledifferences in
the constitutionalscheme in the United States and India in this respect. Chief
JusticeBalakrishnanemphasises, however, that this exercise must proceed with
caution,andcarefully examine structuralsimilaritiesbefore applying thedecision
of aforeign court to a domestic question. He offers several examples in the
jurisprudenceofthe Supreme CourtofIndia that could serve as a modelfor the
use offoreign judgments in constitutionaladjudication.
The topic that I am addressing has been very contentious amongst the legal
community in the United States. Sitting justices of the United States Supreme
Court as well as eminent academics have taken strong positions to justify or
oppose the citation of foreign precedents in constitutional cases. As a representative
of the Indian judicial system, the most appropriate thing for me to do is to present
an 'outsider's view' of this debate and then briefly comment on how foreign
precedents have been treated by the higher judiciary in India.
At the outset, it must be clarified that reliance on foreign precedents is
necessary in certain categories of appellate litigation and adjudication. For instance,
in litigation pertaining to cross-border business dealings as well as family-related
disputes, the actual location of the parties in different jurisdictions makes it
necessary to cite and discuss foreign statutory laws and decisions. Hence, domestic
1
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This is based on a lecture delivered by Hon'ble Mr. Justice K.G. Balakrishnan at the
Northwestern University School of Law (Illinois, U.S.A.) on October 28, 2008.
Presently serving as the Chief Justice of India (January 2007 onwards) at the
Supreme Court of India, New Delhi. The author acknowledges the research
assistance provided by Sidharth Chauhan (Law Clerk to the Hon'ble C.J.I.).
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courts are called on to engage with foreign precedents in fields such as the'Conflict
of Laws'. Furthermore, courts are also required to look into the text and
interpretations of international instruments (i.e. treaties, conventions,
declarations) if their respective countries are party to the same. However, the
room for debate arises in respect of the citation of foreign precedents to decide on
questions pertaining to domestic constitutional law. It is in this regard that some
leading American judges and academics have expressed their opposition to the
reliance on foreign law, especially when this has been done to interpret
constitutional provisions in a liberal manner.
All of us will readily agree with the observation that constitutional systems
in several countries, especially those belonging to the common law tradition,
have routinely been borrowing doctrine and precedents from each other. In the
early years of the United Nations system, a period which saw decolonisation in
most parts of Asia and Africa, many new Constitutions incorporated mutually
similar provisions by drawing from ideas embedded in international instruments
such as the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights [hereinafter "UDHR"]. The European Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [hereinafter "ECHR"], which was
adopted in 1953, also became a source for doctrinal borrowing by emerging
constitutional systems. In later years the provisions of the International Covenant
on Civil Political Rights [hereinafter "ICCPR"] and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights [hereinafter "ICESCR"] have also emerged
as reference-points for such constitutional borrowing. 2
Much of this constitutional transplantation that has taken place by means
of international instruments has also exported certain distinct features of the
United States Constitution - such as a Bill of Rights, 'judicial review' over
legislation and limits placed on governmental power through principles such as
Iequal protection before the law' and 'substantive due process'. It is only natural
that the newly created constitutional systems have sought to learn from longestablished ones such as those of the United States of America. While this
transplantation of constitutional doctrines was predominant in the case of most
newly liberated countries in Asia and Africa, the Soviet-led bloc followed a
divergent path by prioritizing collective socio-economic objectives over basic
individual rights. Since the 1990s, the dismantling of communist rule in the former
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See generally, B. Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 U.
(1997).
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USSR and Eastern Europe has prompted a new wave of constitutionalism, with
several countries adopting written constitutions that provide for basic civilpolitical rights enforceable through judicial means.3
In recent years, the decisions of Constitutional Courts in common law
jurisdictions such as South Africa, Canada, New Zealand and India have become
the primary catalyst behind the growing importance of comparative
constitutional law. In these jurisdictions, reliance on foreign precedents has
become commonplace in public law litigation.' Anne-Marie Slaughter used the
expression 'trans-judicial communication' to describe this trend. In a much-cited
article published in 1994,' she described three different ways through which
foreign precedents are considered, namely:
First,throughvertical means, i.e., when domestic courts refer to the decisions
of international adjudicatory institutions, irrespective of whether their
countries are parties to the international instrument under which the said
adjudicatory institution functions. For example, the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights [hereinafter "ECHR"] and European Court
of Justice [hereinafter "ECJ"] have been extensively cited by courts in several
non-European Union [hereinafter "EU"] countries as well. This also opens
up the possibility of domestic courts relying on the decisions of other
supranational bodies in the future.
*

Secondly, through horizontal means, i.e. when a domestic court looks to
precedents from other national jurisdictions to interpret its own laws. In
common law jurisdictions where the doctrine of stare decisis is followed,
such comparative analysis is considered especially useful in relatively newer
constitutional systems which are yet to develop a substantial body of caselaw. For example, the Constitutional Courts set up in Canada and South
Africa have frequently cited foreign precedents to interpret the bill of rights
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See generally, C.L'Hereux-Dube, Human Rights: A Worldwide Dialogue,in, SUPREME BUT
NOT INFALLIBLE- ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 214 (B.N. Kirpal et al ed.,
2000).
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See generally, M. Tushnet, The Possibilitiesof Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE
L. J. 1225 (1999); S. Chaudhary, Globalisation in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory
of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation,74 IND. L. J. 819 (1999); M. Nussbaum,
Introduction to Comparative Constitutionalism, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 429 (2002).
See generally,A. Slaughter, The Typology of TransfudicialCommunication, 29 U. RICHMOND
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in their respective legal systems. Comparative analysis is also a useful
strategy to decide hard constitutional cases, where insights from foreign
jurisdictions may insert a fresh line of thinking.

*

Thirdly, through mixed vertical-horizontalmeans, i.e. when a domestic court
may cite the decision of a foreign court on the interpretation of obligations
applicable to both jurisdictions under an international instrument. For
example, courts in several European countries freely cite each other's
decisions that deal with the interpretation of the growing body of European
Community [hereinafter "EC"] law. It is reasoned that if judges can directly
refer to applicable international obligations, they should also be free to
refer to the understanding and application of the same in other national
jurisdictions.

In examining these three means of 'trans-judicial communication' one can
easily discern that references to foreign law contemplate both international and
comparative law. While reference to evolving international human rights norms
and decisions of international adjudicatory institutions is accorded a certain
degree of legitimacy in most liberal constitutional systems, there has been
considerable opposition to comparative analysis in constitutional cases in the
United States. In recent years, much of this resistance has been expressed in
respect of the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Atkins v. Virginia [2002]

[hereinafter "Atkins"],6 Lawrence v. Texas [2003] [hereinafter "Lawrence"] 7 and Roper
v. Simmons [2005] [hereinafter "Roper"].I
*

In Atkins, the majority opinion ruled against the constitutionality of the
death penalty for mentally-retarded offenders, and pointed to the
international disapproval of the same.

*

In Lawrence, the majority opinion held that the criminalisation of consensual
homosexual conduct violated the 'due process' clause enshrined in the
Fourteenth Amendment. In the process the Court overruled a previous
decision given in Bowers v. Hardwick [1986],9 wherein it had been held that
there is no fundamental right to engage in consensual sodomy.
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Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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In Roper, the majority ruled against the constitutionality of administering
the death penalty to juvenile offenders, while overruling a previous decision
on the point given in Stanford v. Kentucky [1989].1o For several years, there
has been a prominent dissonance over the citation of foreign precedents
between liberally inclined judges such as Justice Stephen Breyer, and Justice
Antonin Scalia who is known to hold conservative positions. For instance,
in Stanford v. Kentucky [1989], the majority had ruled in favour of the death
penalty for juveniles and Justice Scalia had rejected arguments pointing to
the abolition of the same in several Western European countries. With the
overruling of this case in Roper, Justice Scalia reiterated his opposition to
the citation of foreign precedents in his dissenting opinion," since the
majority opinion delivered by Justice Anthony Kennedy referred to several
international instruments as well as foreign decisions to rule against the
constitutionality of the death penalty for juvenile offenders. In the said
opinion the right against cruel and unusual punishment enumerated in
the Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was read expansively by
way of reliance on foreign materials.

Since the delivery of that opinion, the balance in the US Supreme Court has
tilted in favour of conservatism. With the passing away of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, the Bush administration
preferred to replace them with judges holding conservative inclinations. Justice
Scalia's viewpoint has found more support with the appointment of Chief Justice
John Roberts Jr. and Justice Samuel Alito Jr., both of whom indicated their
opposition to the citation of foreign precedents during the U.S. Senate hearings
for the confirmation of their appointments.12
As per my understanding there have been three distinct objections made
against the citation of foreign precedents in constitutional cases. The first objection
is derived from the 'separation of powers' doctrine, the second one invokes the
'exceptionalism' of the constitutional system of the United States and the third
criticism is based on the idea that reliance on foreign precedents expands judicial
discretion.

10
11
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Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
For an academic opinion surveying the use of foreign law by the U.S. Supreme
Court, see, S.G. Calabresi & S.D. Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of
Law: Two Hundred Years of Practiceand the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WILLIAM &
MARY L.R. 743 (2005).
Cited in, M.C. Rahdert, ComparativeConstitutionalAdvocacy, 56 Am. U. L. R. 553 (2007).
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The first objection is based on the reasoning that since foreign judges are
not accountable to the electorate or any public agency, reliance on their decisions
amounts to an anti-democratic exercise. It is argued that under the doctrine of
'separation of powers', the incorporation of foreign law by way of entering into
treaties or international diplomacy is a function that clearly lies in the executive
domain. The enforcement of these international obligations is subject to a further
check by way of legislative approval. The legislature is also free to borrow from
foreign statutes and precedents in shaping domestic laws, since it is a body
constituted by the electoral process. The 'unelected' judiciary does not have a
role to play in incorporating legal prescriptions which have originated abroad.
In this regard, Justice Scalia has argued that while it is acceptable to discuss
and rely on foreign law in a legislative process such as the framing of a
Constitution, the same should not be done by the judiciary. He has also invoked
the 'originalist' approach to constitutional interpretation by observing that
the framers did not intend any reliance on foreign sources, since there is no
mention of this idea in the constitutional text. Arguments have also been made
to the effect that reliance on foreign precedents is an example of 'judicial elitism'
which is often at odds with the opinions of the majority of the common people.
This argument based on the principle of 'separation of powers' does not appear
to hold too much water since one of the principal functions of judges in a
Constitutional Court is to protect the counter-majoritarian safeguards
enumerated in the Constitution - for instance, the rights of religious minorities,
indigenous groups and affirmative action for historically disadvantaged
communities. Very often, the understanding of these safeguards can benefit
from an evaluation of how similar provisions have been interpreted and applied
in other jurisdictions.
The second criticism draws from the idea of 'exceptionalism' or the unique
status of the United States amongst the comity of nations. It is vehemently
asserted that the framers of the United States Constitution aimed to establish a
polity which was a radical departure from the political institutions of the 'Old
World' and that the American system is meant to lead the way for other countries
and not vice versa." This 'exceptional' status is asserted by referring to several
social, economic and political features prevalent in the country - such as
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Arguments based on the 'exceptionalism' of the American society and polity have
been put forward in the following article: S.G. Calabresi, A Shining City on a Hill:
American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practiceof Relying on Foreign Law, 86
B.U.L.R. 1335 (December 2006).
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constitutionalism, rule of law, a democratic tradition, individual liberties,
respect for private property and a popular culture which promotes enterprise,
respect for morals and progress. This line of reasoning is rather rhetorical since
any country in the world can claim such an 'exceptional' status for itself. A
much better formulation of this idea is that different countries face different
socio-political circumstances and the resolution of constitutional questions must
address the local conditions rather than relying on foreign law.
The most credible objection pertains to the expansion of 'judicial discretion'.
Chief Justice John Roberts Jr. has observed that if judges are allowed to freely rely
on foreign precedents, there is a tendency to arbitrarily cite decisions favourable
to their personal viewpoints. In such a scenario, judges would be free to indulge
in'cherry-picking' for justifying their decisions rather than engaging in a rigorous
inquiry into domestic precedents. Such a consequentalist approach to decisionmaking is considered to be one which dilutes the discipline and rigour expected
of a common law judge who should give due regard to the doctrine of'staredecisis'.
Furthermore, the decisions in Atkins, Lawrence and Roper have raised
apprehensions of a distinct liberal bias in the invocation of international and
comparative law. We should be careful not to confuse the debate on the citation
of foreign precedents as one which corresponds to a political divide between
conservative and liberals. Instead, it should be viewed from the standpoint of
ensuring the integrity of the judicial process. Another significant question is
whether it is acceptable to rely on foreign decisions as 'tie-breakers' in hard
constitutional cases. This is of course linked to the argument that foreign
decisions should not be discussed while confronting the unique socio-political
conditions in each country. If foreign precedents are indeed considered, a
practical question arises as to the relative weightage to be assigned to decisions
from different foreign jurisdictions.
It is at once surprising and disappointing to learn of the extent of distrust of
foreign precedents amongst some prominent members of the legal community in
the United States. American constitutional law has been a source of inspiration
and doctrinal borrowing for many liberal constitutional systems that were
created after it. Judges in India routinely cite precedents from United States Courts
besides other foreign jurisdictions and international laW.14 There is also a distinct
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See, A.M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic
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tendency on part of Indian Courts to refer to academic writings, especially those
from law reviews published by American Universities." It is obvious that the
mere citation of a foreign decision does not imply that a domestic court is bound
to follow the former. A domestic court's citation of a foreign precedent may result
in an approval or distinction from the fact situation before it. In any case, a
foreign precedent should only be assigned persuasive value and cannot be relied
on when it clearly runs contrary to existing domestic law. It is true that the sociopolitical conditions prevailing in different jurisdictions will pose legal problems
particular to them, but there is no reason why constitutional courts in these
countries should not benefit from each other's experiences in tackling them.
As I will proceed to illustrate later, Indian courts have looked to international
as well as comparative sources as part of creative strategies to read in previously
unenumerated norms into the 'protection of life and liberty' guaranteed under Art.
21 of the Indian Constitution. Reliance on foreign precedents has been a vital
instrumentality for the Indian Supreme Court's decisions which have extended
constitutional protection to several socio-economic entitlements and advanced causes
such as environmental protection, gender justice and good governance among others.
Before describing this trend in further detail, it will be useful to examine the various
structural factors that encourage 'trans-judicial communication'.
With the ever-expanding scope of international human rights norms and
international institutions dealing with disparate issues such as trade liberalisation,
climate change, war crimes, law of the sea and cross-border investment disputes
among others, there is a concomitant trend towards convergence in the domestic
constitutional law of different countries. In this era of globalization of legal standards,
there is no reason to suppress the judicial dialogue between different legal systems
which build on similar values and principles. 6
Another factor which sows the seeds for more 'trans-judicial
communication' is the increasing internationalisation of legal education. For
instance, I am given to understand that the leading law schools in Europe as well
as the United States are increasingly drawing students from more and more
countries, especially for postgraduate and research courses. The diversity in the
classroom contributes to cross-fertilisation of ideas between individuals belonging
to different jurisdictions. When students who have benefited from foreign
education take up careers in their respective country's bar and judiciary, they
bring in the ideas imbibed during their education.
15

See, R. Dhavan, Borrowed Ideas: On the Impact of American Scholarship on Indian Law,
33(3) AM. J. Comp. L. 505 (1985).
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Access to foreign legal materials has become much easier on account of the
development of information and communication technology. To take the example
of India, until a few years ago subscriptions to foreign law reports and law reviews
was quite expensive and often beyond the reach of many practitioners and judges
as well. However, the growth of the internet has radically changed the picture.
The decisions of most Constitutional Courts are uploaded on freely accessible
websites, hence enabling easy access all over the world. Furthermore, commercial
online databases such as the LexisNexis and Westlaw, among others, have ensured
that judges, practitioners and law students all over the world can readily browse
through materials from several jurisdictions. Such easy access to international
and comparative materials has also been the key factor behind the emergence of
internationally competitive commercial law firms and Legal Process Outsourcing
[hereinafter "LPO"] operations in India.
The ever-increasing person-to-person contacts between judges, lawyers
and academics from different jurisdictions have been the most important catalyst
for 'trans-judicial communication'. This takes place in the form of personal
meetings, judicial colloquia and conferences devoted to practice areas as well as
academic discussions.
While there are numerous examples of such person-to-person interaction, a
notable example is that of an initiative taken by the Commonwealth Secretariat
in association with INTERIGHTS (International Centre for the Legal Protection of
Human Rights). In February 1988, the first Commonwealth judicial colloquium
held in Bangalore was attended by several eminent judges from different countries
- among them being Justice P.N. Bhagwati, Justice Michael Kirby, Lord Lester,
Justice Mohammed Haleem and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. That colloquium
resulted in the declaration of the Bangalore Principles which deal with how
national courts should absorb international law to fill existing gaps and address
uncertainties in domestic law." Special emphasis was laid on handling
unenumerated norms so as to strengthen the 'rule of law' and constitutional
governance. In December 1998, the Commonwealth Judicial Colloquium on the
'Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms' was again held in
Bangalore. The participants affirmed their commitment to the principles that
had been declared in the 1988 colloquium as well as the deliberations in
17

The text of the principles has been reproduced in: M. Kirby, Domestic Implementation
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